Free Will in a Quantum World? by Allori, Valia
,  
1 
Free Will in a Quantum World? 
 
Valia Allori1 
vallori@niu.edu 
 
Forthcoming in: A. de Barros and C. Montemayor (eds.) “Quanta and Mind: Essays on the 
Connection between Quantum Mechanics and the Consciousness”. Synthese Library 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics 
and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they 
would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. 
Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property people possess when 
they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the 
Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I 
show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or 
it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State 
Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The debate over free will and the development of physics are intertwined. Newtonian mechanics, 
the prototypical deterministic theory2, is in tension with free will: the laws of nature control us as 
the puppet master controls the puppet. Some have resorted to the indeterminism of quantum 
mechanics. However, free will is different from randomness, so it is also incompatible with 
indeterminism.3 Nevertheless, recently Conway and Kochen (1,2) have proven a theorem, which 
they call the Free Will Theorem, to the conclusion that quantum mechanics, no matter whether 
deterministic or stochastic, together with relativity not only are compatible with free will but, in 
some sense, also entails it.4 
The theorem has received a lot of attention by the physical community and by a more 
popular audience5, but has not been discussed within the philosophical community, even if 
Conway and Kochen themselves encourage the philosophers to have a look to their result.6 
Others have previously attempted the similar task of connecting free will with quantum 
                                                 
1 Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, Zulauf Hall 915, Dekalb IL 60115 USA. 
2 Some have questioned the extent to which Newtonian mechanics is deterministic. See, for instance, (3-4). 
However, for the purpose of this paper we can ignore these subtleties since we are concerned with quantum 
mechanics. 
3 See, for instance, (5-10). The basic idea is that laws, deterministic or stochastic, are still ‘in charge’ of future 
actions, we never are: if we are string puppets, the fact that sometimes the strings may jerk randomly does not 
change the fact that we do not decides how we move. 
4 A more precise statement of Conway and Kochen’s thesis will be made clear later in the paper.  
5 The New Scientist (11) has also reported it. 
6 When discussing some features of the free will compatible with quantum mechanics, they write that their remarks 
“might also interest some philosophers of free will” (1, p.1465). 
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mechanics 7 and people have already responded to them.8 However, this time the result is less 
speculative: a theorem, if sound, is more than compelling evidence of the existence of a 
libertarian free will. Moreover, given relativity, this theorem, if sound, follows directly from the 
quantum formalism, without speculations of its origin. As such, it has broader implications than 
Stapp’s theory of free will, for instance, which relies on a particular interpretation of quantum 
mechanics in which the mind is collapsing the wave function. Anyway, there may be various 
reasons why philosophers may not have engaged with this result. One could be that often 
arguments from quantum mechanics are inconclusive.9 Another, that the paper is too technical. 
Be that as it may, in this paper I aim to analyze what the theorem assumes, what it concludes and 
whether it sheds a new light on the free will debate.  
Here is a map of the paper. In Section 2 I present the assumptions and the structure of the 
proof to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail free will of particles. In 
Section 3 I present the objections raised against the Free Will Theorem present in the physical 
literature, essentially that one of the assumption, namely MIN, is false. Instead, in Section 4 I 
focus on the impact of the Free Will Theorem on the free will debate. First, I observe that the 
theorem is question begging, since freedom is assumed in the proof. Then I argue that the authors 
do not even prove that if people are free, then so are particles. Moreover, I argue that if the 
criticism in Section 3 are sound, then the theorem actually disprove locality rather than proving 
freedom of the will (4.2). In addition, even if such criticisms are incorrect, the meaning of “free 
will” used for people is not necessarily the same as the one used for particles, and in general it 
seems absurd to think that the meanings are the same (4.3). Finally, I present Conway and 
Kochen’s Free State Theorem, which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption 
that people are free. I show that the problem with this theorem is that the notion of freedom for 
particles is either in tension with the assumptions made by Conway and Kochen, or it is a species 
of randomness, and therefore not freedom (4.4). Therefore, I conclude that the Free Will 
Theorem, in all its varieties, is a nice piece of mathematical work but its name suggests much 
more than it actually does since it does not entail anything about freedom, neither for us, nor for 
the particles.   
 
2. The Free Will Theorem: SPIN, TWIN, FIN, MIN and DET 
 
In their proof Conway and Kochen consider a particular experimental situation and assume few 
axioms called SPIN, TWIN, FIN (later, MIN), and DET. The experiment involves a pair of 
particles, a and b, with total spin 1 which are traveling in opposite directions, and two 
experimenters, A and B, that can perform experiments on the spin of respectively a and b. 10 
Setting technical details aside, we can talk about the total spin of a set of particles, and the 
                                                 
7 See, most notably (10,12-18). 
8 See for instance (22). 
9 To give an example of this attitude, even if quantum nonlocaltiy seemed to provide a knock down argument against 
Humean supervenience, David Lewis wrote: “if physics tells me that it is false, I wouldn’t grieve […] But I am 
not ready to take lessons in ontology form quantum physics as it now is. First I must see how it looks when it is 
purified of instrumentalist frivolity and dares to say something not just about pointer readings but about the 
constitution of the world; and when it is purified of supernatural tales about the power of observant minds to 
make things up” (23, p.xi). 
10 One should not take this language seriously, but for what is relevant to this discussion, one can imagine a particle 
like a spinning magnet, and think of its spin as its magnetization, so that we can measure the spin of the particle 
using a suitable magnetic field. 
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different values of each particle's spin depend of the direction we are measuring it. The two 
experimenters A and B each use a magnet that can be set to measure the component of the spin of 
the particle arriving toward them along one or another direction. In particular, experimenter A 
can perform an experiment on a to determine its spin along three orthogonal directions (x,y,z); 
and experimenter B can perform an experiment on b to determine its spin along the direction w.  
 
2.1. The Axioms 
 
Quantum theory predicts that the possible results for these experiments are constrained so that 
only certain values can come out from the measurements. This is “the SPIN axiom: 
Measurements of the squared (components of) spin of a spin 1 particle in three orthogonal 
directions always give the answers 1, 0, 1 in some order” (1 p. 227). That is, the set of results 
obtained by A on a is always one of the triplets 1,1,0; 1,0,1; or 0,1,1; and the result obtained by B 
on b is always either 0 or 1.11 
 In addition, quantum mechanics predicts that it is possible to produce pairs of ‘twinned’ 
particles, whose individual spin properties are interconnected with one another.  In other words, 
they are entangled particles. This is “the TWIN axiom: For twinned spin 1 particles, suppose 
experimenter A performs a triple experiment of measuring the squared spin component of 
particle a in three orthogonal directions x, y, z, while experimenter B measures the twinned 
particle b in one direction, w. Then if w happens to be in the same direction as one of x, y, z, 
experimenter B’s measurement will necessarily yield the same answer as the corresponding 
measurement by A” (2 p. 228). That is, whenever w=x (respectively y, or z) then the outcome 
obtained by B coincides with the first (respectively second, or third) digit of the result obtained 
by A.  That is, A and B’s results are perfectly correlated. Like SPIN, also TWIN is a consequence 
of the formalism of quantum mechanics. To emphasize that, in the following I will write 
QM=SPIN & TWIN. 
The third assumption of the theorem does not come from quantum mechanics but from 
relativity theory. Since it deals with the finiteness of the velocity of light, the axiom is called 
“FIN” (from the first three letters of 'finite'): “there is a finite upper bound to the speed with 
which information can be effectively transmitted” (2 p. 1443). Bassi and Ghirardi (23) as well as 
Tumulka (24) have argued that FIN is equivalent to a locality condition, namely the assumption 
that events in a region of space do not affect events in a region which is space-like separated 
from it. If so, these authors claim, Conway and Kochen’s result is another instance of Bell’s 
theorem (25) which shows that no local theory can correctly reproduce the predictions of 
quantum mechanics.12 Therefore, these authors claim that this Conway and Kochen's theorem, 
based on the false FIN assumption, is unsound. In response, Conway and Kochen (2) 
reformulated the Free Will Theorem. They dub it the ‘Strong Free Will Theorem’ and they use 
another axiom instead of FIN, called MIN: “assume that the experiments performed by A and B 
are space-like separated. 13 Then experimenter B can freely choose any one of the [...] directions 
w, and a’s response is independent of this choice. Similarly and independently, A can freely 
                                                 
11 Actually, SPIN is not properly an axiom but rather a theorem (24), so that if quantum mechanics is correct, the 
results of such spin measurements have to be constrained as SPIN says. 
12 Even if Tumulka, Ghirardi and Bassi believe that FIN is exactly the locality condition required in Bell’s proof, 
there is a vast literature that discusses the various notions of locality: see (28) for a review. Moreover, there is no 
full agreement on what Bell’s theorem proves, as also remarked in footnote 16.  
13 That is, the space distance between the two events is too large for a light signal emitted at one event to reach the 
other event, so that one event cannot cause the other. [This footnote is present in the original text.] 
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choose any one of the […] triples x, y, z, and b’s response is independent of that choice” (2 p. 
228). That is, when performing an experiment on the two twinned particles moving in opposite 
directions, there is always a minimum time the information needs for traveling from one particle 
to the other (hence the name “MIN”). In other words, MIN says that the experimental outcomes 
for a are independent of what experiment B chooses to perform on b and vice versa. To simplify 
the notation since both FIN and MIN are a consequence of relativity, in the following, I will 
denote either FIN or MIN with R. 
In addition to SPIN, TWIN and MIN, there is another assumption in the theorem, namely 
that the outcomes of the experiment performed on one of the particles functionally depend on the 
previous state of affairs. That is, there are two function, Fa for particle a and Fb for particle b, 
each of which expresses the results in terms of the initial state. This functional dependence is 
Conway and Kochen’s definition of determinism (thus the assumption's name “DET”): “particle 
a's response is a function [...] of the information [...] available to it” (1 p. 1445). 
 
2.2. The Proof of the Strong Free Will Theorem  
 
Here is my reconstruction of the proof.  Assume DET: there are functions, Fa and Fb, connecting 
the experimental outcomes with the initial states and which express the results of the experiments 
on a and b respectively. Because of MIN, each of these results, say Fa, does not depend on the 
experiment that B actually performs on b. Given SPIN and TWIN, Fa and Fb can assume only a 
certain range of values, and a particular relation between the two particular functions, called 
‘101-functions, holds.14 Conway and Kochen provide a geometrical proof that such 101-
functions in the current experimental setting cannot exist (1 p. 1468). Therefore, it is impossible 
to have outcomes of experiments to functionally depend on previous states of affairs in ways 
consistent with the axioms QM (=SPIN, TWIN) and R(=MIN):  
 
(1) (QM & R) & DET  → contradiction. 
 
To solve such contradiction one should reject one of the premises. Conway and Kochen argue 
that SPIN and TWIN, being at the heart of quantum mechanics, cannot be rejected. Similarly, 
MIN being a consequence of relativity theory, is also undeniable. Therefore, they argue, the only 
option is to reject DET. Denying DET, Conway and Kochen continue, amounts to say that 
particles are free. That is, defining FW_particles = ~ DET, we have the “Strong Free Will 
Theorem” for deterministic theories (sFWTd):   
 
 (sFWTd)  (QM & R)  → FW_particles.  
 
In their words: “the axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to 
a triple experiment is free — that is to say, is not a function of properties of that part of the 
universe that is earlier than this response with respect to any given inertial frame” (2 p. 228). 
 Conway and Kochen additionally claim that “randomness won't help” (1 p. 1463). In fact, 
they propose a method of converting any stochastic model into a deterministic one: “let the 
stochastic element [...] be a sequence of random numbers (not all of which need be used by both 
particles). Although these might only be generated as needed, it will plainly make no difference 
to let them be given in advance. But then the behavior of the particles in such a theory would in 
                                                 
14 The details of these functions are irrelevant for our purposes. 
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fact be a function of the information available to them (including this stochastic element) [...]” (1 
p. 1463). This analogy from Menon (27) is helpful to understand the proposal: suppose you and 
your friend want to play a game of die, then you roll all dice before the game, write down all the 
results, and then use this fixed information to play the game. Conway and Kochen claim that we 
would still have the same sort of functional dependence (denoted with DET’ in the following 
equation) that gives rise to contradiction noted before (if TWIN, SPIN and MIN are preserved in 
the stochastic-deterministic conversion):   
 
(2) (QM & R) & DET ' → contradiction. 
  
Therefore, the more general version of the strong Free Will Theorem, valid also for stochastic 
theories reads as follows:    
 
(sFWTd&i)  (QM & R) → FW_particles. 
 
That is, it is a consequence of quantum mechanics and relativity that particles are free. If the 
theorem really proves this, it is very good news for the libertarian: not only nobody could say 
that their view is contrary to physics, but also they would have a mathematical proof that they are 
correct! I will argue in Section 4 that this is too good to be true. Nevertheless, before this, let me 
discuss in the next section the other criticisms that the theorem has received in the literature. 
  
3. Criticisms 1: The Constraints on the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics  
 
In addition to this, Conway and Kochen take their theorem to be an “impossibility proof” against 
deterministic completion of quantum mechanics and the possibility of constructing relativistic 
invariant stochastic quantum theories.  Quantum mechanics suffers from the measurement 
problem: if quantum mechanics is a theory only about the wave-function evolving according to 
the Schrödinger evolution, then unphysical “macroscopic superpositions,” that is in 
superpositions of macroscopically different states of affair (like a dead and an alive cat), arise.  
Several theories have been proposed to deal with this, some of which are deterministic, like the 
pilot-wave theory (30, 31), others instead are stochastic, like the spontaneous localization theory 
(32). The former avoids macroscopic superpositions postulating that the complete description of 
any physical system is given by the wave-function together with the particles position evolving 
deterministically. The spontaneous localization theory instead postulates that the wave-function 
evolves stochastically so that the macroscopic superpositions promptly disappear.  
Conway and Kochen argue that their theorem rules these theories out. Since they claim 
that conditional (1) implies that determinism is false, they conclude that deterministic 
completions of quantum mechanics are impossible.  From conditional (2) they conclude that any 
stochastic completions of quantum mechanics so constructed cannot be made relativistic 
invariant, given that they would violate relativity (by violating MIN).  
 
3.1. MIN in Deterministic Theories  
 
Several authors have criticized these claims. Goldstein et al. (33) argue that MIN, like FIN, is 
equivalent to a locality condition, LOC, which entails that the (probability) distribution of the 
experimental results for a is independent of the distribution of the results for b. LOC, according 
,  
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to these authors, can be broken down in two conditions: parameter independence (PI) and 
outcome independence (OI). PI says that the experimental outcomes for a are independent on the 
parameters chosen by B for the experiment to perform on b; OI says that the results for a are 
independent on the results for b. For deterministic theories, since there is just one outcome, OI is 
trivially true and LOC reduces to PI. Since, according to these authors, in this case PI = MIN, 
then LOC = MIN. Therefore (sFTWd) reads:  
 
(QM & LOC) & DET → contradiction.   
 
The problem is that, according to these critics, Bell's theorem shows that:   
 
 (BT)   (QM & LOC) → contradiction,  
 
so that the contradiction in (sFTWd) is not resolved by rejecting DET, as Conway and Kochen 
do: one would have to reject either LOC or QM. Thus, the critics conclude, the sFWTd should be 
considered as a proof on nonlocality.  As such, then, it does not pose any threat to the pilot-wave 
theory or any other deterministic completion of quantum mechanics.15 
Wüthrich (34) similarly claims that if DET is true, then outcomes of one arm of the 
experiment will depend on the settings of the other arm. Therefore, for any deterministic theory 
that violates PI, and therefore MIN, (sFWTd) does not apply. In addition, Wüthrich takes (29) to 
disagree with (33) in the identification of MIN with LOC since Menon identifies MIN with some 
sort of counterfactual dependence. That is, MIN requires that it makes sense to ask what the 
result would have been in one wing had the observer on the other wing made a different choice. 
In this way, at best (sFWTd) rules out causal determinism, and not all deterministic theories are 
causal. Either way, Wüthrich concludes that (sFWTd) does not rule out deterministic theories 
like the pilot-wave theory. 16 
 
3.2. MIN in Stochastic Theories 
 
Considering now (sFWTd&i), the theorem works only if, as Conway and Kochen propose, there 
is a method to convert any stochastic theory into a deterministic one, “putting all randomness 
into the past” (33 p. 1455). However, Goldstein et al. (33) show that such method would make 
MIN false, and therefore would invalidate the conclusion that DET' is false. In fact, assuming 
MIN reduces to PI, then PI is violated by the conversion method proposed by Conway and 
Kochen because “if nature were to follow the recipe suggested […] then she should have to use 
the values of k=k(x,y,z,w) depending on both experimenters' choices, (x,y,z) and w, in order to 
produce any of the outcomes” (33 p. 1455). Therefore, according to these authors, the 
contradiction in (2) is again resolved because MIN is false, and not because DET' is false.  
Goldstein and collaborators note that Kochen has suggested that MIN should not be 
                                                 
15 That deterministic quantum theories like the pilot-wave theory must violate parameter independence has been 
known for a long time, but apparently the fact has not been appreciated enough.  
16 Notice that these critics disagree on what Bell’s theorem proves: while (25-26,33) as well as (35-37) claim that it 
proves nonlocality, i.e. ~LOC, (29,34) instead seems to think that it rules out local deterministic completions of 
quantum mechanics, i.e. ~(LOC&DET). If it is the former, then Bell’s theorem provides a constraint for all quantum 
theories: any quantum theory (deterministic or stochastic) has to deny locality. In contrast, if it is the latter, Bell’s 
theorem provides constraints only to deterministic quantum theories, and not on stochastic ones. Luckily, this 
distinction is not relevant from the discussion in this paper.  
,  
7 
interpreted as PI but rather “as requiring that the actual outcome itself of [one experiment] to be 
independent of B's choice, and not just its probability distribution.” However, Tumulka (26) 
writes that this strategy of pre-generating random information will not work for his proposal of a 
relativistic invariant spontaneous collapse theory since the distribution of the flashes, the 
ontology of the theory, depends on the choice of the directions of both arms of the experiment. If 
the distribution were given in advance, also these choices must be given in advance and they 
cannot because of DET’.  In response, Conway and Kochen (2) change their argument. Instead of 
pre-generating the information about flashes (which depends on the particular choice), they pre-
generate the flash distribution of all possibilities. In this way, the choice together with the pre-
generated information determines the particles’ response. However, Menon (27) claims that that 
would be a violation of (sFWTd&i) since the particles’ response would not be independent of 
past information and thus they would violate DET’. Menon therefore identifies the real problem 
to be MIN. He believes that it incorporates a notion of “robust” causation, which is too strong. 
Similarly, Wüthrich (34) argues that Conway and Kochen’s argument against Tumulka either is 
an illegitimate way of introducing randomness, or it is legitimate but then it defeats itself.   
 
4. Criticisms 2: Which Constraints the Free Will Theorem Actually Poses of the Free Will 
Debate?  
 
Regardless of whether one considers the criticisms presented in Section 3 to be decisive or not, 
there are other concerns regarding the theorem's impact on the philosophy of free will. Therefore, 
let us assume for the sake of the argument that sFWTd&i works. If so, then physics (quantum 
mechanics and relativity) entails that there is free will in a libertarian sense, since the proof 
involves the denial of determinism. As emphasized, if true, that would be great news for the 
struggling libertarians. Let us see whether this is the case.  
 
4.1. Begging the Question 
 
Going back to the definition of MIN, one immediately sees that there is an additional assumption 
we haven’t spelled out: “[...] experimenter B can freely choose [...]”(2 p. 228, emphasis added). 
Thus, the core of (sFWTd&i) is that if the experimenters have free will, then also the particles 
are free. That is, the conditional strong Free Will theorem is:  
 
 (Cond.sFWT)  (QM & MIN') & FW_people → FW_particles,  
 
where FW_people is the assumption that experimenters have free will, and MIN' is the portion of 
MIN without such assumption. However, if so, the theorem begs the question: the problem for 
the philosopher interested in free will is to determine whether the experimenter has free will! 
Formulated in this way, therefore, the theorem loses much of its appeal to the libertarian.17 
 
4.2.  The Conditional Claim  
 
                                                 
17 Also Wüthrich (34) claims that the theorem is question begging, even if in a different way: while Wüthrich is 
concerned on whether the Conway and Kochen theorem proves indeterminism, I am more concerned in whether 
it proves free will, and the literature on free will teaches us that the relation between lack of determinism and 
free will is not straightforward. 
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Proving the conditional claim might nevertheless be interesting. However, if the criticisms in 
Section 3 are correct, Conway and Kochen do not manage to prove it. In fact, (Cond.sFWT) 
implies that:  
 
 (QM & MIN) & DET → contradiction.   
 
For deterministic theories, if R=MIN=LOC, we have  
 
 QM & LOC & DET → contradiction,  
 
that together with Bell’s theorem (BT) implies that LOC is false, not that DET is. Hence, one 
cannot conclude that FW_particles=~ DET is true. In addition, deterministic models of 
indeterministic theories fail MIN, so that  
 
 (QM & MIN) & DET' → contradiction   
 
implies that MIN is false, not that DET is. So again, we cannot conclude that FW_particles is 
true. 
  
4.3. On The ‘FW_people’ and The ‘FW_particles’ Conditions 
 
Even granting for the sake of the argument that the criticisms reported in Section 3 are mistaken, 
there are further problems connected to the fact that the notion of freedom for people discussed 
by Conway and Kochen is far from clear. If the result is (Cond.sFWT), is the assumption 
FW_people true?  
Conway and Kochen say that FW_people is presumably true because it is the denial of 
determinism, and determinism is an implausible view, just like solipsism: “both the non-
existence of free agents in determinism and the external world in solipsism are rightly 
conjectured up by philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what 
is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe” (1 p. 1462).  
However, consider what FW_people says: “experimenters are free to choose between 
possible experiments” (2 p. 228). This sense of freedom is not incompatible with a deterministic 
universe: even if there is just one possible future, the experimenter does not know which one it 
is. Therefore, for all relevant purposes, one just needs an epistemic rather than a metaphysical 
notion of freedom. FW_people could therefore assert that the world is as if the experimenter can 
choose of orienting the magnet along a given direction. Since this is compatible with a 
deterministic universe, FW_people is not necessarily the denial of DET: it could just be a 
compatibilist notion of freedom. That is, even a compatibilist version of the FW_people 
assumption would do the trick for Conway and Kochen. Conway and Kochen, though, do not 
consider this possibility, since they regard determinism as “not serious:” they therefore want a 
libertarian notion of freedom. The problem though, is that they provide no argument for it: they 
simply write that if determinism is true then there is no way of making sense of science. 
However, this is not the case. Their worry seems to be that, if determinism is true then it would 
be pointless for an experimenter to perform experiments. If so, though, they are conflating 
predictability in practice with predictability in principle: if determinism is true it is possible in 
principle to predict the results of all possible experiments, but that does not mean that the 
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experimenter actually has (or has to have) the necessary information to perform such 
computation. Thus, compatibilist freedom seems to be enough to make sense of science.  
In addition, the theorem is advertised as showing that “if indeed there exist any experimenters 
with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this 
commodity” (1 p. 1444). In other words, “if experimenters have a certain property then spin 1 
particles have exactly the same property. Since this property for experimenters is an instance of 
what we usually call ‘free will,’ we find it appropriate to use the same term also for particles” 
(1 p. 1444, emphasis added). That is, FW_people is the same property as FW_particles. 
However, we have just seen that FW_people is not necessarily the denial of DET (since it can be 
compatible with it), while FW_particles is, by definition. Thus, even if FW_people is true, the 
theorem does not show that the same property applies to people and particles.  
Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, assume that “FW” means the same thing for 
particles and people. Now the question is whether it is possible for particles and people to share a 
property like free will. Even if philosophers like Alfred Whitehead (35) have arguably 
entertained such a view, it seems an implausible one: how can the property “FW” really mean 
what we ordinarily mean by free will and at the same time be attributed to people and to 
particles? This seems to involve a category mistake: while it seems appropriate (at least, 
intuitively) to consider observers as agents which may possess properties like free will, beliefs, 
desires, or knowledge, it does not seem to be sensible to ascribe these properties to particles, 
which are not agents, and whose typical properties are position, momentum, mass, or spin.  
 
4.4. The Free State Theorem: Doing Without The ‘FW_people’ Condition 
 
Let us set these considerations aside for a moment and consider the role the FW_people 
assumption plays in the proof of the Free Will Theorem. I argued above that it might simply 
express the idea that the world is as if different experiments can be performed, not that the world 
has actually an open future, which is perfectly compatible with a deterministic universe with a 
compatibilist free will.  Because of this, it seems to me, the FW_people assumption should not 
be necessary in the proof. It is beyond the scope of this paper to see whether this is truly the 
case.18 Interestingly enough, Conway and Kochen seem to recognize that: “there is a 
modification of the theorem that does not need the Free Will assumption. Physical theories since 
Descartes have described the evolution of a state from an initial arbitrary of ‘free’ state according 
to laws that are themselves independent of space and time. We call such theories with arbitrary 
initial conditions free state theories” (2 p. 1447). Consequently, they propose a version of the 
Free Will Theorem that does not contain the FW_people assumption, which they call “The Free 
State Theorem,” FST (1 p. 1447): 
  
 (FST)   (QM & MIN)  → FW_particles. 
 
Conway and Kochen observe that it would be extremely unpleasant if the theorem would depend 
on FW_people. In fact, as many before them19, they speculate that “it is natural to suppose that 
this latter freedom [of the particles] is the ultimate explanation of our own” (2 p. 230). However, 
if the Cond.sFWT theorem works at best it proves the opposite, namely that people’s freedom 
grounds the freedom of the particles. Therefore, they need to prove FW_particles independently 
                                                 
18 See (29,34,38-44) and references therein for a relevant discussion in the context of Bell’s theorem. 
19 See e.g. (10). 
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of FW_people, which they allegedly do with the FST.  
Therefore, if the FW_people assumption is not needed and the FST is sound, we might 
have arrived to something interesting. Nonetheless, does the FST prove particles are free? As 
already noted, Conway and Kochen explicitly reject compatibilism (since they reject 
determinism), so that they have to go with a libertarian notion of free will for particles. However, 
we have already seen that this is difficult to define: the core idea of libertarians is to attribute free 
will to people as agents and never to particles, in virtue of the fact that agents have properties 
that particles do not possess. In other words, in the libertarian framework we are fundamentally 
different from particles: in particular, particles have no free will, only we, as agents, do.   
 Another option for Conway and Kochen is not to invoke agency and to stick with their 
definition of FW_particles as the denial of determinism but still different from randomness. 
Indeed, Conway and Kochen suggest that ‘free particles’ means ‘particles that are randomly 
behaving constrained by the axioms of quantum mechanics.’ They write: “the freedom we have 
deduced for particles is more constrained, since it is restricted by the TWIN axiom” (2 p. 230). In 
other words, particles’ behavior is not described functionally and it is constrained by TWIN, 
while randomness is behavior is completely without constraints. This is compatible with their 
assumption that FW_particles = ~ DET. However, I think that this does not help at all: 
constrained randomness is, for all our purposes, still randomness, and the traditional objections 
that randomness is not freedom still hold. This constrained randomness implies that the behavior 
of particles is governed by laws which put constraints on their random behavior. This means that 
particles are string puppets whose strings jerk randomly but, say, cannot exceed a certain limit. 
As in the case of pure randomness, particles are not in control of their behavior. If one wishes, 
one can call this ‘freedom’ but this notion has not much to do with our common understanding of 
freedom.  
To conclude, I think that the impact of the theorem on the free will debate is null. In fact, 
even if the theorem proves something about the property “FW_particles,” such property is either 
inconsistent, given that libertarian freedom attributed to particles seems an oxymoron, or it is 
‘constrained’ randomness, and as such it is difficult to see how it may have something to do with 
the concept of freedom as traditionally intended. 
  
,  
11 
Refeneces 
 
1. Conway JH, Kochen S. The free will theorem. Found. Phys. 2006; 36:1441 p.  
2. Conway, JH, Kochen S.  The strong free will theorem. Not. Am. Math. Soc. 2009; 56:226 p.  
3. Earman J. A primer on determinism. Dordrecht: Reidel; 1986.  
4. Norton, John. The dome: an unexpectedly simple failure of determinism. Philos. Sci. 2008; 
75(5): 786 p.  
5. Searle J. Mind, brains, and science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1984. 
6. Strawson G. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1986. 
7. Pinker S.. How the mind works. New York: Norton; 1997. 
8.  Clarke R. Libertarian accounts of free will. New York: Oxford University Press; 2003. 
9. Balaguer M. A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Noûs. 
2004; 38 (3): 379 p. 
10. Kane R. The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
11. Merali Z.. Free will - you only think you have it. New Sci. Sci. J. 2006; 190, 2550: 8 p. 
12. Compton A. The freedom of man. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1935. 
13. Popper K. Objective knowledge. Oxford: Claredon Press; 1972.  
14. Nozick R. Philosophical explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1981. 
15. van Inwagen P. An essay on free will. Oxford: Claredon Press; 1983.  
16. Penrose R. Shadows of the mind: a search for the missing science of consciousness. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1994. 
17. O'Connor T. In: T. O'Connor, editor. Agents, causes, and events: essays on indeterminism and 
free will. New York: Oxford University Press; 1995. 
18. Stapp H. Quantum propensities and the brain−mind connection. Found. Phys. 1991; 21(12): 
1451 p. 
19. Stapp H. Mind, matter and quantum mechanics. New York: Springer; 1993. 
20. Stapp H. Why classical mechanics cannot naturally accommodate consciousness but quantum 
mechanics can? Psyche 1995; 2 (5). 
21. Stapp H. Quantum theory and free will: how mental intentions translate into bodily actions. 
New York: Springer; 2017. 
22. Loewer B. Freedom from physics: quantum mechanics and free will. Philos. Topics. 2003; 23 
(2): 91 p. 
23. Lewis D. Philosophical papers II. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986. 
24. Kochen S, Specker E. The problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics.” J. Math. 
Mech.1967; 17: 59 p. 
25. Bassi A. Ghirardi GC. The Conway–Kochen argument and relativistic GRW models. Found. 
Phys. 2007; 37, 2: 169 p. 
26. Tumulka R. The assumptions of Bell’s proof. In: M. Bell, and S. Gao, editors. Quantum 
nonlocality and reality: 50 years of Bell's theorem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
2016. 79 p. 
27. Bell JS. On the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox. Physics 1964; 1: 195 p..  
28. Redhead M. Incompleteness, nonlocality, and realism: a prolegomenon to the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1989. 
29. Menon T. The Conway-Kochen free will theorem, manuscript. 2010. 
30. de Broglie L. La nouvelle dynamique des quanta. In: J. Bordet, editor. Electrons et photons: 
rapports et discussions du cinquième conseil de physique. Paris: Gauthier-Villars; 1928: 105 
,  
12 
p.  
31. Bohm D. A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of `hidden' variables, I 
and II. Phys. Rev. 1952; 85: 166 p. 
32. Ghirardi GC, Rimini A, Weber T. Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic 
systems. Phys. Rev. D 1986; 34: 470 p. 
33. Goldstein S, Tausk DV, Tumulka R, Zanghì N. What does the free will theorem actually 
prove? Not. Am. Math. Soc. 2011; 57 (11): 1451 p. 
34. Wüthrich C. Can the world be shown to be indeterministic after all? In: C. Beisbart and S. 
Hartmann, editors. Probabilities in physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011. 365 p.  
35. Whitehead AN. Process and reality. New York: MacMillan; 1929. 
36. Albert DZ. Quantum mechanics and experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1992. 
37. Maudlin T. Quantum non-Locality and relativity: metaphysical intimations of modern 
physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1994. 
38. Norsen T. Foundations of quantum mechanics: an exploration of the physical meaning of 
quantum theory. Cham: Springer; 2017.  
39. Bell JS. Free variables and local causality. Dialectica 1985; 39: 103 p. 
40. Clauser, John, Michael Horne and Abner Shimony. An exchange on local beables. Dialectica 
1985; 39: 97p.  
41. Goldstein S, Norsen T, Tausk DV, Zanghì N. Bell’s theorem. Scholarpedia 2011; 6(10): 8378 
p. 
42. Maudlin, Tim. What Bell did. J. Phys. A 2014; 47(42): 4010 p.  
43. Bricmont J. What did Bell prove?. In: M. Bell and S. Gao, editors. Quantum nonlocality and 
reality: 50 years of Bell's theorem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2016. 49 p.  
44. Tumulka R. Comment on ‘the free will theorem’. Found. Phys. 2007; 37: 186 p. 
 
